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The INS No-Work Rider and the Plight of the
Undocumented Worker
Georgina M. Mahoney*
Dario de Avila and Ignacio Robles are cousins. A few years
ago they came to the United States from Chihuahua, Mexico with-
out the official knowledge of United States immigration authori-
ties. Undocumented workers, they live in the Chicago area,
sharing an apartment with other relatives who also came to this
country without papers.1 From seven in the morning until half
past three the cousins work as janitors in a nursing home. From
four in the afternoon until midnight they hold second jobs as jaid-
tors at a car dealership. Both jobs pay minimum wage. With hope
of finding weekend cleaning jobs in private homes, Dario and Igna-
cio have also placed advertisements in local newspapers. Each
month they try to send money home to Mexico to their aging par-
ents and their grandmother, who receive no old age benefits of any
kind.
Dario and Ignacio are in many ways typical of undocumented
workers arrested by the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS): they are under thirty, male, single, and citizens of one of
Mexico's northern states.2 They are the working poor. If arrested
* Georgina M. Mahoney is a 1986 J.D. candidate at the University of Minne-
sota. The author would like to thank the Editors of the Law & Inequality Journal
for all their help.,
1. Dario de Avila and Ignacio Robles used to be co-workers of mine. I have
changed their names. An undocumented worker is one who enters the United
States without the knowledge or permission of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS).
2. Ronald Goldfarb, Migrant Farmworkers: A Caste of Despair 122-27 (1981).
Goldfarb suggests that 70% of undocumented workers are under 30, 90% are men,
and many come from the five poor, rural Mexican states which border the United
States. Goldfarb does not explain why the majority of undocumented workers ap-
pear to be men. As long as workers remain unregistered, their numbers and char-
acteristics will remain unknown. INS registration and arrest figures are virtually
the only source of statistics. Other writers suggest that the undocumented popula-
tion consists of numerous women-more than INS figures would suggest. See, e.g.,
Marlene Dixon, Elizabeth Martinez, & Ed McCaughan, Chicanas and Mexicanas
Within a Transnational Working Class: Theoretical Perspectives, 7 Fernand
Braudel Rev. 109 (1983). Due to the lack of reliable data, only speculation explains
why only 10% of those arrested by the INS are women. Possibly immigrant women
may work at home or in smaller enterprises less vulnerable to INS raids. Or the
INS may have an unwritten policy of arresting fewer women than men. For addi-
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by the INS, it would prove difficult for them to raise money for
release on bond. Money for lawyers is almost out of the question,
and their undocumented status disqualifies them from free legal
help in any law office funded by the Legal Services Corporation.3
The cheapest and easiest course of action, if arrested by the INS,
would be to leave the country voluntarily and later re-enter the
United States as soon as possible.
In 1983, the INS proposed a change in its regulations, requir-
ing appearance and delivery bonds to contain automatic conditions
prohibiting those released by the INS from holding jobs in the
United States.4 This proposed change is popularly known as the
automatic no-work rider. The no-work rider prohibits employ-
ment during the course of deportation proceedings, a process
which generally takes more than a year because of INS backlogs. 5
The National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. (NCIR), which
provides legal services to undocumented workers, has challenged
the new regulation on several grounds: 1) the proposed regulation
exceeds statutory authority; 2) it is not reasonably related to the
purpose of assuring the alien's appearance at future deportation
hearings; 3) the INS promulgated it unlawfully; 4) it violates fifth
amendment guarantees of due process and equal protection; and 5)
it is inconsistent with and superceded by other laws.6
In this argument I outline the current legal challenge to the
new regulation and demonstrate how the regulation will hurt indi-
viduals facing deportation proceedings. I first examine popular at-
titudes and current politics surrounding immigration to the United
tional details on the statistics of undocumented workers, see infra notes 25-26. For
an excellent discussion of Hispanic migration to the United States, see Douglas
Massey & Kathleen Schnabel, Recent Trends in Hispanic Immigration to the
United States, 17 Int'l Migration Rev. 212 (1983). Massey and Schnabel suggest that
the number of men and women is approximately equal in the population of regis-
tered immigrants.
3. 45 C.F.R. § 1626 (1984). If Dario and Ignacio were to apply for asylum, they
might be eligible for such legal services. Id. Fortunately, the pro bono bar has pro-
vided legal services to many undocumented workers. The National Center for Im-
migrants' Rights, Inc. is one such organization.
4. The Board of Immigration Appeals characterizes appearance and delivery
bonds as "formal instruments governed by the general provisions of 8 C.F.R.
103.6(a), (b), and (e). These instruments create a contract between the [Immigra-
tion and Naturalization] Service, the bending agent, . . . and the surety company.
There is, however, no contract between ... the Service and the named alien ......
Matter of Allied Fidelity Insurance Co., Interim Decision No. 2972 at 3 (BIA 1984).
5. Brief of Appellees at 15, National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v.
INS, 743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).




States. I then conclude that the no-work rider represents another
illegal posture toward people undergoing deportation proceedings.
I. The Context of the Problem
Because of the wide-scale affluence and isolation in the
United States from much of the rest of the world, many of its citi-
zens do not understand the causes of poverty. The United States,
with only about five percent of the world's population, consumes
over one-third of the world's resources. 7 Those of us who enjoy
this unprecedented wealth may ignore the circumstances which
have led to the affluence in the United States and adopt an ideol-
ogy in which we attribute our success solely to our own hard
work.8
Those of the middle class tend to forget the special privileges
of race, class, sex, and physical well-being which many of us have
enjoyed throughout our lives. It is easier to blame the poor for
their poverty.9 The hard-core unemployed are called lazy. The
homeless who wander our streets become the targets of jokes. Top
government officials deny the reality of hunger in the United
States.10 Our current president claims to champion the interests
of the poor, but his policies have increased poverty.1 1 Such public
7. Lester Brown, World Without Borders 357 (1973).
8. Such special circumstances include vast regions of fertile farmland and
reserves of minerals, ore, and oil. European settlers took much of this land away
from the Native American nations who once enjoyed it; other land was taken from
Mexico through a series of wars. Consequently, many of today's undocumented
workers from Mexico dwell in places which once belonged to Mexico. See Rodolfo
Acufia, Occupied America: A History of Chicanos (2d ed. 1981). Other conditions
which led to affluence in the United States include hundreds of years of slavery,
which helped the New World accumulate valuable capital. See Manning Marable,
How Capitalism Underdeveloped Black America 3-10 (1983). Thus, the unprece-
dented affluence in the United States has been paid for by the suffering of many
oppressed groups.
9. See, e.g., Welfare Mothers Speak Out (Milwaukee County Welfare Rights
Organization ed. 1972). See also William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (rev. ed. 1976)
for an excellent discussion of how such attitudes allow the privileged to maintain
their status without examining the causes of privilege.
10. Before he became attorney general, Edwin Meese made a series of remarks
to this effect. Robert McFadden, Comments by Meese on Hunger Produce a Storm
of Controversy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1983, at 12, col. 5.
11. Frances Fox Piven & Richard Cloward, The New Class War: Reagan's At-
tack on the Welfare State and Its Consequences (1982); David Rosenbaum, How
Candidates Erred in the Debate, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1984, at A29, col. 4. For exam-
ple, the Reagan administration has cut Medicaid and nutrition programs for
mothers and children. The latest figures on infant mortality reveal the tragedy of
such cuts. Although the rate for white infants dropped four percent since 1981, the
rate for Black infants went up two percent to 20 deaths per 1,000 live births-al-
most exactly double the rate for white children. See Alexander Cockburn, That's
Show Business, 240 Nation 263 (1985); N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1985, at Al, col. 1.
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and private attitudes reduce the problem of poverty to one of mi-
nor consequence. It is no surprise that our nation looks conde-
scendingly on the obstacles that poor nations face to
development. 12 Indeed, the United States at times behaves hos-
tilely toward nations already poor.13 In addition to killing civil-
ians, overt and covert wars devastate the production of crops and
other goods necessary for the people to live,14 thus creating barri-
ers to development.
The traditional measures of economic "growth" in the Ameri-
cas' 5 may be deceptive. Evidence suggests that people living in
12. Drew Christiansen, Basic Needs: Criterion for the Legitimacy of Develop-
ment, in Human Rights in the Americas: The Struggle for Consensus 245, 252 (Al-
fred Hennelly & John Langan eds. 1982).
13. The most recent example of this behavior is the current campaign against
Nicaragua, the goal of which is to overthrow that country's elected government.
Nicaragua: Can the Sandinistas Survive?, NACLA Report on the Americas, Jan.-
Feb. 1985, at 33-42.
14. For example, the United States aids counterrevolutionaries (contras) who
not only kill civilians but also try to disrupt the Nicaraguan economy by bombing
farms, agricultural storage facilities, and factories. Beth Stephens, The Contra War
of Terror: Prelude to an Invasion?, Nicaraguan Persp., Fall 1984, at 21. Two
Maryknoll nuns describe the aftermath of a summer 1984 attack on their Nicara-
guan village:
It was an attack against people: men, women, and most sadly, children.
As we stood in front of the charred and still burning beans and corn
from the silos which were attacked, it was impossible for us to imagine
how anyone could think they were achieving anything by burning our
food supplies. These people have worked so very hard in their fields
for the so very little that they have....
Id. at 24.
15. In this essay I focus on the Americas as a hemisphere. Many United States
citizens refer to their country as "America," forgetting that others who live in this
hemisphere also view their countries as "America." For example, in 1903 Nicara-
guan national poet Ruben Dario addressed a poem to then-President Theodore
Roosevelt in which the poet contrasted the United States with another America-
his Nicaragua.
Los Estados Unidos son potentes y grandes.
Cuando ellos se estremecen hay un hondo temblor
que pasa por las v6rtebras enormes de los Andes....
Sois ricos.
JuntAis al culto de Hrcules el culto de Mamm6n;
y alumbrando el camino de la ficil conquista,
la Libertad levanta su antorcha en Nueva-York.
Mas la America nuestra, que tenia poetas
desde los viejos tiempos de Netzahualcoyotl, .
que consult6 los astros, que conoci6 la Athlntida...
esa America
que tiembla de huracanes y que vive de amor, .. vive.
Y suefia. Y ama, y vibra, y es la hija del Sol.
Tened cuidado. iVive la America espaiola!
Hay mil cachorros sueltos del Le6n Espaxiol.
(The United States is big and powerful.
When it shakes there is a deep tremor
that passes through the enormous vertebrae of the Andes....
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already poor nations have in fact become increasingly impover-
ished.16 In addition to unemployment and underemployment rates
often in excess of fifty percent,17 in many countries only a handful
possess the wealth and land.18 This situation, combined with pov-
erty and political oppression,19 prompts many to seek relief in mi-
gration to the United States.20
You are rich.
You associate the cult of Hercules with the cult of Mammon;
Liberty raises her torch in New York,
lighting the way of easy conquest.
But our America, that had poets
from the ancient times of Netzahualcoyotl, .
that consulted the stars, that knew Atlantis...
that America
that trembles with hurricanes and lives with love . y lives.
And dreams. And loves and is alive and is the daughter of the Sun.
Be careful. Latin America lives!
There are a thousand of the Spanish lion's cubs running loose.]
Rub6n Dario, A Roosevelt, in Antologia de Ruben Dario 45, 46 (Jaime Torres Bodet
ed. 1966) (emphasis added). The Americas (North America, Central America,
South America, and the Caribbean) are linked economically, politically, and geo-
graphically. Since at least 1823, when then-President James Monroe unilaterally
declared that the United States would not permit European intervention in the
Western Hemisphere, successive United States presidents have treated the area
from the Canadian territories to the tip of South America as essentially one geo-
political unit for the purposes of drawing the boundaries of the United States'
sphere of influence. Two authors further expose the United States' colonization of
the Americas as one of their major themes. Noam Chomsky & Edward Herman,
The Washington Connection and Third World Facism (1979).
16. Christiansen, supra note 12, at 245.
17. Mitchell Seligson & Edward Williams, Maquiladoras and Migration Work-
ers in the Mexico-United States Border Industrialization Program 55 (1981).
18. Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People 20 (1982).
Whether the country is Brazil or Guatemala, more or less industrial-
ized, in South or Central America, the statistics are always the same: a
tiny minority, usually 1 to 4 percent of the population, owns the ma-
jority of the arable land and takes an overwhelming share of the na-
tion's agricultural and industrial wealth. The great majority [of the
people], in the slums or impoverished rural villages, owns little or no
land, is undernourished, illiterate or semiliterate, and unemployed or
underemployed.
Id.
19. Some distinguish between "economic" refugees and "political" refugees.
This distinction is misleading. In reality, economic and political oppression often
occur together. When the poor attempt to empower themselves through coopera-
tives or unions, their governments often repress them. Penny Lernoux offers Para-
guay as a typical example of a government which attempts to repress self-
government among the poor: "[Whenever an attempt is made to establish coopera-
tives or unions, the government suddenly discovers a 'communist conspiracy' and
sends troops into the countryside to destroy the cooperatives, burn the peasants'
huts, rape the women, and kill or imprison the men." Lernoux, supra note 18 at 20-
21.
20. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 120-26. No consensus, however, exists on whether
or not unemployment and poverty alone lead immigrants to enter the United States
in search of work. See Jorge Bustamante, The Mexicans are Coming: From Ideology
to Labor Relations, 17 Int'l Migration Rev. 323, 324 (1983) ("there is not a direct
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In nineteenth century Europe, during a period of industriali-
causal relationship between poverty and emigration to the United States .... ")
(citing Wayne Cornelius, Building the Cactus Curtain: Mexican Migration and U.S.
Responses, from Wilson to Carter (1980)). The United States' policies in the Amer-
icas discourage and sometimes prevent balanced agricultural and industrial diversi-
fication, which might benefit the poor. See Mario Barrera, Race and Class in the
Southwest 191 (1979). Indeed, United States and multinational corporations have
profited by consistently exploiting Latin America's labor and non-renewable natu-
ral resources. See Theodore Moran, Multinational Corporations and the Politics of
Dependence: Copper in Chile 3 (1974); Michael Turner, Stealing the Third World's
Nonrenewable Resources: Lessons from Brazil, Monthly Rev., April 1984, at 26-35.
Pablo Neruda, the late Chilean poet and winner of the 1971 Nobel Prize for Litera-
ture, expressed this reality thus:
Cuando son6 la trompeta, estuvo
todo preparado en la tierra,
y Jehovi reparti6 el mundo
a Coca-Cola Inc., Anaconda,
Ford Motors, y otras entidades:
la Compaiiia Frutera Inc.
se reserv6 lo mis jugoso,
la costa central de mi tierra,
la dulce cintura de Am6rica.
[When the trumpets had sounded and all
was in readiness on the face of the earth,
Jehovah divided his universe:
to Coca-Cola, Inc., Anaconda,
Ford Motors, and similar entities:
the most succulent item of all,
the United Fruit Company Incorporated
reserved for itself:
the central coast of my country,
the soft waist of America.]
Pablo Neruda, La United Fruit Co., in Canto General 246 (1950). As Noam Chom-
sky and Edward Herman have noted, profits become more important than human
rights:
Human rights have tended to stand in the way of the satisfactory pur-
suit of U.S. economic interests-and they have, accordingly, been
brushed aside, systematically. U.S. economic interests in the Third
World have dictated a policy of containing revolution, preserving an
open door for U.S. investment, and assuring favorable conditions of in-
vestment. Reformist efforts to improve the lot of the poor and op-
pressed, including the encouragement of independent trade unions, are
not conducive to a favorable climate of investment.
Chomsky & Herman, supra note 15, at 53. Furthermore, many of our past and
present policy makers have decided that our national security requires support for
the status quo. Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy Toward
Latin America 379 (1981). Again, as Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman have
noted:
The basic fact is that the United States has organized under its spon-
sorship and protection a neo-colonial system of client states ruled
mainly by terror and serving the interests of a small local and foreign
business and military elite .... Since 1960 over 18 Latin American re-
gimes have been subjected to military takeovers-a "domino effect"
neglected in the West. U.S. influence has been crucial in this process,
in some cases by means of deliberate subversion or even direct aggres-
sion, but invariably important given the substantial economic and mili-
tary penetration and presence of the superpower.
(Vol. 3:407
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zation and related enclosure of lands, hundreds of thousands of
people emigrated to North America.2 1 Today, when industrializa-
tion and enclosures are combined with even greater population
pressures in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is often the
descendents of those very European immigrants who protest the
most loudly. They fail to see that the new immigrants are re-
sponding to the problem in ways not dissimilar to their own ances-
tors'. In fact, they make the undocumented worker the scapegoat
for the failure to reach the goal of full employment in the United
States.22 Abundant evidence shows, however, that non-citizens,
particularly the undocumented, contribute more than their share
of taxes and help create jobs in many sectors. 23
Undocumented workers come from many parts of the
world.24 Because of their status, they are hidden from the public
view. They are the source of much controversy. Thus, their exact
numbers are unknown.25 A substantial percent of the undocu-
Chomsky & Herman, supra note 15, at ix. Similarly, past and present United States
administrations have viewed indigenous struggles to combat oppression as manifes-
tations of Soviet expansionism. Editors' Introduction to El Salvador: Central
America in the New Cold War at 4 (Marvin Gettleman, Patrick Lacefield, Louis
Menashe, David Mermelstein & Ronald Radosh eds. 1982).
21. See Brown, supra note 7, at 62-63; 1 Karl Marx, Capital 786-87, 1080-82 (Ben
Fowles trans. 1977).
22. Bustamante, supra note 20, at 323 ("[T]he political use and publicity given to
the issue of Mexican migration to the United States varies with the appearance and
disappearance of economic crises [in the United States], particularly those which in-
volve marked increases in unemployment."). See also Acufia, supra note 8, at 155-
89 (massive roundups of undocumented workers occur most frequently in times of
economic crisis).
23. Julian Simon, Nine Myths About Immigration, Heritage Found. Back-
grounder, Feb. 1, 1984, at 1, 4-5.
24. The number of individuals seeking to enter the United States exceeds immi-
gration quotas. Two groups of visas subject to numerical limitation are limited by
statute to 270,000 visas per year. 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1982). These are available on a
worldwide basis of 20,000 visas per year to certain independent countries as identi-
fied by the State Department. In the case of Mexico, the annual quota is 40,000.
The number of people wishing to emigrate from Mexico, however, greatly exceeds
40,000 per year. Thus many people come to the United States without immigrant
visas. Non-immigrant visas, which include certain classes of tourists, students, and
business people, are not subject to any numerical limitation. These visas are, how-
ever, sometimes difficult to obtain.
25. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 124. "Experts guess that the total is over 8 mil-
lion, though many ... stay only temporarily." Id. at 125. Courtenay Slater, former
chief economist at the Commerce Department, estimates the total at slightly over
two million. For her calculation, she used both census estimates and other sources
to develop a profile of the undocumented worker population. The United States
Census Bureau's methodology, used by Slater, consisted of taking the number of
foreign-born people identified by the census and subtracting the number of immi-
grants who have registered with the INS. Illegal Aliens Aid Economy, Study Finds,
Chicago Tribune, Dec. 28, 1984, § 1, at 3, col. 4 [hereinafter cited as Illegal Aliens
Aid Economy].
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mented, though seldom mentioned, are Europeans. Mexicans com-
prise roughly fifty percent of the total, but are the focus of most of
the debate and the activities of the INS.26 Mexicans constitute ap-
proximately ninety percent of those arrested by the INS.27 These
statistics on apprehension suggest an INS preoccupation with ar-
resting Spanish-speaking workers, especially Mexicans.28 Spanish-
speaking workers are vulnerable targets for INS agents.29 Pan-his-
26. Bustamante, supra note 20, at 329. Courtenay Slater describes the undocu-
mented population as follows: 50% come from Mexico, 25% come from Central and
South America, 10% come from Asia, and the remaining 15% come from Europe,
Canada, Africa, and Oceania. Thus, about 75% of immigrants to the United States
come from the Americas. Illegal Aliens Aid Economy, supra note 25, § 1, at 3, col.
4.
27. Gilbert Cardenas, Los Desarraigados: Chicanos in the Midwest Region of the
United States, 7 Aztlin 153, 165 (1976).
28. Bustamante, supra note 20, at 329. Bustamante attributes this apparent pre-
occupation with arresting Spanish-speaking workers, especially Mexicans, to xeno-
phobia. Id. at 328. Mexicans as a class have been blamed for a variety of social ills,
especially unemployment in the United States. See supra note 22.
29. The probable cause standard for INS arrest is broader than it is in the crim-
inal context. For example the speaking of a foreign language may constitute rea-
sonable cause. The Immigration and Nationality Act empowers immigration agents
to arrest, without a warrant, "any alien ... if [she or] he has reason to believe that
the alien so arrested is ... in violation of any such law . .. and is likely to escape
before a warrant can be obtained .... 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2) (1982). In practice,
this standard is quite broad. United States v. Rodriguez, 532 F.2d 834, 836 (2d Cir.
1976) (in view of the information received from an informant that "illegal aliens"
were living in two houses, an INS agent who noticed a male of "Hispanic appear-
ance" seated in an "old" car was justified in questioning the suspect concerning his
right to be in the United States).
Identity documents have been proposed which would quickly identify citizen-
ship status. Many ethnic organizations oppose proposals for identity documents
which would verify citizenship, arguing that they would result in discrimination on
ethnic and perhaps racial grounds. Presumably, such proposed regulations would
appear neutral on their face. Nevertheless, INS agents likely would continue their
practice of arresting Hispanics disproportionately.
Discussions of legal challenges to selective prosecution often begin with Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), a case in which a municipal licensing ordinance,
neutral on its face, was held unconstitutional because the city enforced it largely
against Chinese business establishments. Similarly, criminal prosecutors may not,
in theory, prosecute based on the exercise of first amendment rights. In contrast to
criminal prosecutors, the INS may investigate those who criticize it. For example,
the INS recently raided the offices of El Diario, a Spanish language daily newspa-
per in New York which has openly criticized the Simpson-Mazzoli bill and condi-
tions at INS detention facilities. INS agents "visited" the offices of El Diario to
check the immigration status of three reporters and an editor. The editor, Manuel
de Dios Unanue, claimed that the visit was in retaliation for criticism of the INS: "I
don't accept their excuse for coming in here. It was too much of a coincidence that
three of the people they wanted to talk to wrote the articles on Hispanics confined
by the I.N.S." Jesus Rangel, Immigration Agents Visit Offices of Spanish-Lan-
guage Newspaper, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1984, at L31, col. 5. The agents checked,
were satisfied that the four employees were lawfully here in the United States, and
the case was closed. Id.
More recently, using evidence gleaned by the INS, the Justice Department has
also begun to arrest those who openly give sanctuary to Central American refugees
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panic organizations complain of raids in which workers are ar-
rested in the middle of the night and detained.3 0 Even in their
sleep, undocumented workers find no respite from the threat of
discovery and deportation.
On the other hand, government officials appear to tolerate
the presence of undocumented laborers in the United States at cer-
tain times and in certain regions. In such cases, the government
may act under pressure from agribusiness and industry, which de-
mand a source of cheap labor.31 Lower labor costs for industry in-
crease competitiveness. In reality the flow of Mexican workers
between the United States and Mexico is part of an international
labor migration. This migration is sometimes described as a "push-
pull" phenomenon. 32 Poverty in their homelands "pushes" work-
ers to emigrate. Relative economic stability in the United States,
in turn, "pulls" them here. Another less recognized "pull" factor,
however, arises out of the many advantages of using foreign work-
ers. For example, agricultural employers can legally pay workers
and their children 33 sub-minimum or low wages. If workers live in
housing that is incident to their employment, as do many
farmworkers, they do not enjoy benefits currently accorded to
legal tenants.34 Finally, undocumented workers' fear of discovery
who fear death or persecution if they return to their homelands. See Tom Morgan-
thau, No Hiding Place Here, Newsweek, March 4, 1985, at 14. Perhaps such inci-
dents are not the fault of the INS. It is a common conclusion that the INS is
understaffed and nearly overwhelmed by statutory obligations. See David
Weissbrodt, Immigration Law and Procedure in a Nutshell 396 (1984).
30. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 121. This practice, however, may occur
infrequently.
31. Acufia, supra note 8, at 163.
32. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 121 ("The fundamental problem lies in the
profound causes of illegal immigration, not in the inadequacy of the stopgap of en-
forcement. In the parlance of those who analyze our country's immigration poli-
cies, illegal aliens in the agricultural labor market pose a 'push-pull' problem of
international policies.").
33. Many assume that child labor has been eradicated. This is false. Laws per-
mit child labor in the agricultural sector. See, e.g., Ronald Taylor, Sweatshops in
the Sun (1973); Paula DiPerna, Child Labor and Pesticides: The Lethal Cloud of In-
difference, 232 Nation 786 (1981); Expanding the Kiddie Work Force, 147 America
44 (1982).
34. Traditionally, "a farm laborer, occupying a house on a farm, does so as a ser-
vant, and not as a tenant." Turner v. Mertz, 3 F.2d 348, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1925). Un-
documented workers who work on farms have little bargaining power and little
freedom of movement. If they complain about living or working conditions, their
employers may retaliate by reporting them to immigration authorities. In recent
years, however, a few federal district courts have recognized that migrant
farmworkers can be "tenants." Folgueras v. Hassle, 331 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Mich.
1971); Franceschina v. Morgan, 346 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Ind. 1972). In reaching this
result, both courts recognized the fiction of "free" housing for the workers, noting
that they paid rent in the form of extremely low wages.
1985]
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and deportation discourages them from organizing. 35 Thus, in ex-
amining migration, one cannot discount these less recognized
"pull" factors that encourage employers to hire undocumented
workers.
Immigration expert Jorge Bustamante argues that business,
which helps create a demand for undocumented labor, also influ-
ences the rules governing migration. 36 This influence reflects the
imbalance of power between United States employers and immi-
grant workers. 37 Government and business tolerate undocu-
mented labor's presence because it fills the "secondary labor
market."38 Many critics posit the existence of two labor markets
to explain the persistence of poverty among minority peoples in
the United States.39
The primary market offers jobs with security, good pay, and
possibility for advancement. The secondary market offers jobs
with opposite conditions.40 It is in the secondary labor market that
Africans, Latin Americans, and other minorities and their
descendents are disproportionately employed. Employers in mar-
ginal industries and services who are able to employ minorities,
particularly the undocumented, have much to gain from this sys-
tem. The imbalance of power between employer and undocu-
mented employee is most clearly manifested by regulations which
penalize employees for accepting work, rather than the employers,
the source of the "pull," who do the hiring. While it is generally
illegal for an alien 4 ' to accept employment in this country without
special authorization, it is not illegal for an employer to hire such a
person under federal law.42
35. In theory, undocumented workers have the right to be protected from retal-
iation for union activity. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 104 S. Ct. 2803 (1984). In prac-
tice, an employer could leave an anonymous tip with INS agents.
36. Bustamante, supra note 20, at 324.
37. Id.
38. Barrera, supra note 20, at 209-12.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 209.
41. The INA defines an alien as "any person not a citizen or national of the
United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1982).
42. Goldfarb, supra note 2, at 121. Both versions of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill,
proposed last congressional term, would have imposed sanctions on employers. S.
529, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 1510, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). This may
explain why Congress has not yet passed the bill, despite persistent calls for "immi-
gration reform." Several senators, however, plan to re-introduce a "streamlined"
version of the bill in the 99th Congress. The heart of this bill still involves em-
ployer sanctions. John Dillin, U.S. Immigration-reform Backers Plan Early Push,
Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 20, 1985, at 1, col. 3. Twelve states have employer sanc-
tion laws. Cal. Lab. Code § 2805 (West Supp. 1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31-51k
(West Supp. 1985); Del. Code Ann. tit. 19, § 705 (1979); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 448.09
(West Supp. 1981); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-4409 (1981); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26,
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Since the 1920's, immigration officials have engaged in publi-
cized campaigns to deport undocumented Mexican workers. The
campaigns usually coincide with hard economic times: for example,
the early 1930's, the recession of 1954, and the recessions of the
1970's and early 1980's. 4 3 The better publicized the deportations,
the more they placate the xenophobia of some sectors of the
United States public44 who favor a "get tough" policy toward un-
documented workers.45 Mass investigatory stops of workers are
therefore likely to be politically popular. The INS regularly con-
ducts farm and factory raids in which armed agents block worksite
exits and question employees about their immigration status.46
The constitutionality of such raids was recently upheld by the
United States Supreme Court.47
Undocumented workers already face a massive governmental
apparatus that restricts their civil and political rights. Because
they cannot vote, they are not represented in government. They
encounter state-sanctioned discrimination every day. In particular
the undocumented live in fear day and night of deportation-a
civil penalty in theory, a quasi-criminal punishment in reality.48
Now the INS has proposed a new legal tool to exert an even
higher degree of control over undocumented workers.
§ 871 (West Supp. 1984); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 149, § 19C (Michie Supp. 1985); Mont.
Code Ann. § 39-2-305 (1983); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 275-A:4-a (Supp. 1983); N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 34:9-1 (West 1965); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 444a (1978); Va. Code § 40.1-
11.1 (1981).
43. Acufia, supra note 8, at 163.
44. See, e.g., Barrera, supra note 20, at 213 ("To the extent that employers have
been successful .... [white and] Anglo workers have seen their enemies as the
manipulated minority workers, rather than the manipulators.").
45. See Dilin, supra note 42.
46. Elizabeth Hull, Without Justice for All 100-05 (1985).
47. INS v. Delgado, 104 S. Ct. 1758 (1984). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, found that raids did not constitute searches or seizures within the mean-
ing of the fourth amendment. Instead, he characterized mass interrogations of
workers by armed INS agents as "classic consensual encounters." Id. at 1765. Jus-
tices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting, took the majority to task for its "studied air
of unreality." Id. at 1767.
Although none of the respondents was physically restrained by
the INS agents during the questioning, it is nonetheless plain beyond
cavil that the manner in which the INS conducted these surveys
demonstrated a "show of authority" of sufficient size and force to
overbear the will of any reasonable person....
. As a final reminder of who controlled the situation, one INS
agent remarked as they were leaving Delgado that they would be com-
ing back to check him out again because he spoke English too well.
Id. at 1769-70 (emphasis added).
48. Like a criminal conviction, deportation may result in "loss of both property
and life; or of all that makes life worth living." Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276,
284 (1922).
Law and Inequality
II. The Proposed Regulation: The INS No-Work Rider
On November 7, 1983, the INS revised its regulations gov-
erning appearance and delivery bonds.49 In general, persons de-
tained by the INS pending deportation or exclusion hearings may
be released on bond if they agree to fulfill the bond conditions,
typically payment of a sum of money and a promise to appear at
the hearing.50 Under the revised regulation, the INS District Di-
rector automatically imposes a no-work rider on the bond.51 This
rider prohibits the released person from holding a job. It allows
the District Director, at her or his sole discretion, to grant special
work authorization in certain instances, upon the alien's filing an
application for relief. The alien has the burden of showing special
hardship before the work authorization is granted. Among the fac-
tors which may be considered when an application is made (by the
alien to the District Director) are the following:
(a) Safeguarding employment opportunities for United States
citizens and lawful permanent resident aliens;
(b) prior immigration violations by the alien;
(c) whether there is a reasonable basis for considering discre-
tionary relief; and
(d) whether a United States citizen or lawful permanent resi-
dent spouse or children are dependent upon the alien for support,
or other equities.5 2
A. A Legal Challenge: National Center for Immigrants'
Rights, Inc. v. INS
On December 6, 1983, one day before the regulation was to
become effective, the National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc.
49. 8 C.F.R. §§ 103.6, 109.1 (1985). See supra note 4 for an explanation of ap-
pearance and delivery bonds.
50. The conditions of a delivery bond are specific. They are violated if the obli-
gor fails to cause the alien to appear upon each and every request until deportation
proceedings in the case are finally terminated. Matter of Smith, 16 I. & N. Dec. 146,
151 (R.C. 1977).
51. The new regulation provides in part: "A condition barring employment
shall be included in an appearance and delivery bond in connection with a deporta-
tion proceeding.... Only those aliens who upon application... establish compel-
ling reasons for granting employment authorization may be authorized to accept
employment." 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(ii)-(iii) (1985). The previous INS regulations
provided that the District Director, with the prior approval of the Regional Com-
missioner, could include a condition barring unauthorized employment in an ap-
pearance and delivery bond in connection with deportation proceedings. 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.6(a)(2)(ii) (1983). In contrast, the new regulation does away with individual-
ized determinations: the INS imposes the no-work rider automatically.
52. 8 C.F.R. § 103.6(a)(2)(iii) (1985).
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(NCIR) brought suit to prevent implementation of the INS rider.53
After a hearing on December 8, 1983, the United States District
Court for the Central District of California denied a temporary re-
straining order and scheduled a hearing on the NCIR's motion for
a preliminary injunction.54 On December 16, 1983, after hearing
evidence and testimony, the court granted a nationwide prelimi-
nary injunction against enforcement of the regulation.55 The court
based its decision on only two of the NCIR's theories. First, it con-
cluded that the NCIR has a probable chance of proving the regula-
tion inconsistent with the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Second, the court found it likely that the regulation violates due
process guarantees.56 In addition, the court found that the harm to
the plaintiffs would be irreparable if the regulation were applied
to them.57 It further observed that individuals subject to the no-
work condition would be unable to support themselves and their
dependents pending their deportation hearings and consequently
would have more difficulty obtaining bonds58 and counsel.59 The
court therefore held that the harm to the plaintiffs clearly out-
weighed the government's harm from delay in implementing the
regulation.60
The INS appealed the injunction to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit remanded the
case back to the district court for class certification.61
On March 7, 1985, United States District Judge David Ken-
yon, Jr. granted summary judgment to the NCIR.62 First, the
court found that the automatic no-work rider went beyond the
statutory authority of the INS. Second, the court found that the
regulation was not reasonably related to ensuring an alien's ap-
pearance at future hearings.6 3 The INS plans to appeal the
53. National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365, 1367 (9th
Cir. 1984).
54. Id. at 1367-68.
55. Id. at 1368.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. For some plaintiffs in detention, the employment prohibition was the
only factor preventing their release with the assistance of bonding companies.
Brief of Appellees at 6, National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. INS, 743
F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
59. 743 F.2d at 1368.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1371-72. The NCIR framed its complaint as a class action, but did not
move for class certification prior to the preliminary injunction. The district court
enjoined the INS from applying the regulation without making any findings as to
class membership.
62. No. 83-7927-KN, slip op. at 15 (C.D. Cal. March 7, 1985).




In the interim, although the automatic no-work rider regula-
tion appears in the 1985 Code of Federal Regulations, the rider has
not gone into effect. Only the appeals process will determine
whether the regulation will ever be implemented.
The Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of Shuen 65
ruled that the injunction against enforcement of the automatic no-
work rider does not automatically cause the original version of
that regulation to be revived. In other words, the INS cannot en-
force the case-by-case no-work rider which appeared in the 1983
Code of Federal Regulations. Thus, while appeals are pending,
neither the case-by-case nor the automatic no-work rider will be
imposed in appearance and delivery bonds-unless, of course, the
INS re-promulgates the 1983 version of the no-work rider.
B. Bond Conditions Under Earlier INS Regulations
Previous INS practices and Attorney General opinions evince
a demand for limits on the imposition of no-work riders. Congress
delegates major responsibility for enforcement of the Immigration
and Nationality Act to the Attorney General,66 who in turn dis-
charges his duties through the INS, a division of the Department
of Justice. Congress authorizes the Attorney General to set a vari-
ety of bond conditions. The Attorney General and the INS exer-
cise wide discretion over bond conditions. The government may
generally enter into contract arrangements or take any bonds not
prohibited by law, even though not expressly mandated by stat-
ute. 67 In the immigration context, courts do not limit the govern-
ment's recovery on a bond to the damages flowing from the alien's
breach of a bond condition.68 'Nevertheless, bond conditions must
be reasonable.69 Courts have upheld bail amounts as high as
$25,000 where the INS deemed the detainee a poor bail risk.7 0 In
keeping with the INS's purported policy of keeping detention peri-
ods at a minimum,71 courts have concluded that no bond should be
required at all unless the alien is a threat to national security or a
64. Miami Herald, March 11, 1985, at A4, col. 1.
65. Interim Decision No. 2977 (BIA 1984).
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982).
67. United States v. Wolper, 86 F.2d 715, 717 (2d Cir. 1936).
68. United States v. Goldberg, 40 F.2d 406, 407 (2d Cir. 1930). In other words,
the government's monetary recovery is not limited to damages the government can
show it suffered because the alien violated a condition of the bond.
69. Matter of Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. 523, 527 (BIA 1972, AG 1974).
70. Hernandez-Avila v. Boyd, 294 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1961).




Earlier INS regulations did not always permit no-work riders.
As in the criminal context, certain double or multiple bond condi-
tions, such as admission of the undocumented alien as a non-immi-
grant and his or her promise to depart promptly, have been
enforceable in federal court.73 In the early 1970's a respondent74
in deportation proceedings challenged the authority of the INS to
impose no-work conditions in Matter of Toscano-Rivas.7 5 In Tos-
cano-Rivas, the Board of Immigration Appeals and later the Attor-
ney General found that the INS had the authority in some
circumstances to impose such a condition. The Attorney General
expressed preference, however, for appropriate substantive safe-
guards with respect to the imposition of such a no-work rider:
"[B]efore a condition of that nature is imposed, there should be a
regulation of the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service dealing
specifically with the subject."76
In response to the Attorney General's opinion, the INS al-
tered its regulations to provide for prior approval by the Regional
Commissioner of any condition barring the alien's employment,77
creating the "case-by-case" no-work rider. The revised regulation
set forth nine factors to be considered before imposing a no-work
condition. The factors included the existence of a financially de-
pendent spouse or children or "other equities."7 8 In addition,
these no-work riders were not automatically upheld by the Board
of Immigration Appeals, in light of the serious concern expressed
by the Attorney General in Toscano-Rivas for utmost care in im-
72. Matter of Vea, 18 1. & N. Dec. 171, 174 (BIA 1981); Matter of Patel, 15 I. &
N. Dec. 666, 666 (BIA 1976). In practice, as the Board of Immigration Appeals rec-
ognized in Patel, the alien should be granted release on personal recognizance un-
less she or he poses a risk to national security or is likely to flee the jurisdiction.
The INS has discretion to determine whether the alien threatens national security
and may base its decision on undisclosed security information. United States ex rel.
Barbour v. District Director of the INS, 491 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 873 (1974). The factors considered relevant by the Board of Immigration
Appeals in Patel to determine bail risk include: prior arrests, convictions, illegal en-
try into the United States, participation in "subversive activities," employment sta-
tus, and the presence of relatives in the United States. The bail or parole decision
is reviewable by any court of competent jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982).
73. Earle v. United States, 254 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 822
(1958).
74. A respondent is a person facing deportation proceedings.
75. 14 1. & N. Dec. at 523 (BIA 1972, AG 1974).
76. Id. at 556.
77. Matter of Leon-Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 239, 240 (BIA 1975).
78. Id .; Matter of Chew, 18 I. & N. Dec. 262 (BIA 1982). Those factors resemble




posing bond conditions prohibiting employment.7 9 Thus, under
earlier regulations immigration judges imposed no-work riders on
a case-by-case basis, subject to further administrative review.
On November 7, 1983, the INS revised its regulations to pro-
vide for the automatic inclusion of the no-work rider-the regula-
tion at issue in National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v.
INS. Incredibly, a decade earlier, during the oral arguments for
Toscano-Rivas, attorneys for the INS assured the members of the
Board of Immigration Appeals that no-work riders would not be
imposed on a massive scale.80 The revised regulation, however,
does just that.
C. Legal Arguments
The legal arguments at issue in National Center for Immi-
grants' Rights, Inc. v. INS find several bases in the Constitution.
First, the revised regulation may exceed the statutory authority of
the Immigration and Nationality Act. Nowhere in the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act does Congress explicitly authorize the At-
torney General to impose a no-work rider.8 1 Although the
Attorney General has wide discretion in setting conditions for re-
lease on bond from INS custody, the statute requires that condi-
tions be reasonable.82 Furthermore, due process requires that
government acts pass at least a rational basis standard of review.8 3
The Board of Immigration Appeals and the Attorney General
agree that a bond serves two purposes. A bond may assure the ap-
pearance of the allegedly deportable individual at a forthcoming
hearing and "protect American workers."8 4 The INS concedes,
however, that the revised regulation may not have any net effect
on the number of individuals permitted to work.8 5 Theoretically,
the District Director of the INS could grant discretionary relief to
every applicant who applies. Thus, the automatic no-work rider
79. Matter of Leon-Perez, 15 I. & N. Dec. 239, 241 (BIA 1975).
80. Counsel [for Toscano-Rivas] asserted that . . . if we permit the Ser-
vice to impose this no-work condition the Immigration Service will ex-
act a similar bond from every alien arrested inside the United States.
The appellate trial attorney [for the INS] denied that the Service has
such an intention. He stated that the result of such action would be
great hardship, that large numbers of dependents would be forced onto
relief rolls pending processing of immigration cases, and that this is
not what the Service wants.
14 1. & N. Dec. at 537 (emphasis added).
81. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (1982).
82. Matter of Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. 523 (BIA 1972, AG 1974).
83. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
84. Matter of Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. 523 (BIA 1972, AG 1974).
85. 48 Fed. Reg. 51,143 (1983).
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may not have the effect of safeguarding employment opportunities
for United States citizens. It also does not assure the appearance
of the respondent at forthcoming hearings. Undermining a per-
son's ability to work discourages her or him from maintaining the
stable life within the jurisdiction which insures her or his appear-
ance at hearings. The regulation coerces people to leave the coun-
try rather than exercise their right to a deportation hearing.
Because the regulation is not rationally related to its two articu-
lated purposes, it cannot satisfy the minimum requirements of due
process.
Moreover, the proposed regulation may violate liberty and
property interests within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments: no person shall be deprived of "life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law." 86 Loss of a job calls into ques-
tion both liberty and property interests.8 7 The regulation violates
these interests without a due process hearing.88
In recent decades, federal courts have expanded the defini-
tion of property to include such diverse interests as welfare bene-
fits, 89 drivers' licenses,90 attendance at public schools,91 and many
other important interests. Wages, in particular, are afforded pro-
tection by the courts.
The Supreme Court in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. 92
recognized that wages are a "specialized type of property present-
ing distinct problems in our economic system." When a creditor
uses government-enforced procedures to garnish the wages of an
alleged debtor, the government deprives the debtor of an impor-
tant property interest. Because of the special role that wages play
in our society, the Court in Sniadach invalidated the garnishment
of a portion of a wage earner's salary to safeguard the interests of
an alleged creditor, absent a prior hearing.
93
86. U.S. Const. amend. V, XIV.
87. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
88. No hearing of any type is held either before imposing the no-work rider or
in conjunction with the application for relief to the District Director. Although
persons can seek review of the no-work rule before immigration judges in bond-
redetermination "hearings," these are informal proceedings in which no testimony
is taken, no opportunity for cross-examination exists, and no verbatim record is
kept. Also, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a lengthy process during
which people subject to the no-work rider have to go without access to the basic
necessities of life. Brief of Appellees at 14-15, National Center for Immigrants'
Rights, Inc. v. INS, 743 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1984).
89. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970).
90. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
91. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
92. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
93. Id. at 342.
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For those who have jobs when arrested by the INS, the new
regulation is even harsher than the procedure challenged in Snia-
dach. The garnishment statute at issue in that case only allowed
creditors to take a certain percentage of a worker's wages. The re-
vised INS regulation takes away a worker's entire livelihood auto-
matically, even though deportability has not yet been established.
Employment, even more than the welfare benefits at stake in
Goldberg v. Kelly, helps a worker meet the "basic demands of sub-
sistence." 94 To terminate an individual's employment automati-
cally, without a due process hearing, is to take away her or his
means of subsistence. Not until the deportation hearing occurs is
the respondent's deportability actually adjudicated.95
Liberty interests are also a concern. The NCIR further con-
tends that detained persons have a protected liberty interest in
working until their deportability is determined. Among the liber-
ties that the due process clause protects is the right to pursue a
profession.96 Liberty interests that the Supreme Court has recog-
nized include a prisoner's right to freedom upon release on pa-
role97 and a high school student's interest in freedom from
"unjustified intrusions on personal security" (corporal punish-
ment).98 The loss of a job is an equally severe deprivation and in-
trusion into a worker's life.
In order for a respondent in deportation proceedings to lead a
stable life within the jurisdiction, she or he must be allowed to
continue working until deportability has been adjudicated. The
automatic termination of employment means the automatic termi-
nation of a livelihood.
D. The Effect of the Regulation
As did the attorney for the INS in Toscano-Rivas ,99 the NCIR
predicts that respondents will experience extreme hardship if the
regulation ever goes into effect. First, the regulation conflicts with
the INS policy of keeping detention periods at a minimum. 0 0 The
INS has conceded that the regulation will result in fewer bonds
being written and more people being detained for longer periods of
94. 397 U.S. 254, 265 (1970).
95. The Second Circuit held in United States ex rel. Bishop V. Watkins, 159 F.2d
505, 506 (2d Cir. 1947), cert denied, 331 U.S. 839 (1947), that the government has the
initial burden of proving, with clear and unequivocal evidence, that the alleged
alien is indeed an alien.
96. Ludtke v. Kuhn, 461 F. Supp. 86, 96 n.7, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
97. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-82 (1972).
98. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977).
99. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 537.
100. Matter of Kwun, 13 I. & N. 457, 464 (BIA 1969).
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time. 101 As a practical matter, individuals prohibited from work-
ing find it difficult to obtain bonds.' 02 As a consequence, many re-
spondents will remain in detention centers.
Second, the typical undocumented worker, having no money
for a lawyer and ineligible for most free legal services,103 may be
detained in an isolated rural area, far from pro bono immigration
attorneys. Thus the respondent may be unaware of her or his
legal options upon detention: bond re-determination hearings,
habeas corpus petitions, application for the removal of the no-work
rider itself, and other types of discretionary relief.
Respondents who manage to secure release from detention
may fall deeper into poverty, as will domestic and foreign relatives
relying on respondents' earnings in the United States. Without
employment, people without documents have no legal means to
supplement or maintain their income. They will be unable to af-
ford food, housing, and medical care. Due to recent trends limiting
non-citizen participation in such programs, many respondents are
essentially ineligible for public benefits and welfare programs.1
04
Worse yet, persons lawfully present in the United States may be
erroneously arrested, detained, and prohibited from working.
Many workers will simply ignore the no-work rider and con-
tinue to hold jobs clandestinely. If the breach is discovered, the
workers will be detained. This additional penalty ultimately in-
creases the power differential between employer and worker: the
latter would have an even greater incentive not to organize or
cause other trouble for the employer.
Ultimately, perhaps, the number of persons affected by this
regulation might be relatively small, as release on recognizance
rather than bond is the general practice in many parts of the coun-
try. Nonetheless, the regulation codifies a callous attitude toward
respondents facing deportation, who are often poor. The migration
of undocumented workers to the United States is largely a conse-
quence of the economic inequality between people living in the
United States and the Third World. Many people seek to escape
poverty and oppression by entering the United States. A plethora
of laws compels them to accept inequality when dealing with em-
ployers and government agencies. The no-work rider is not a fair
way to control the INS's caseload. The automatic no-work rider il-
101. See Matter of Toscano-Rivas, 14 I. & N. Dec. at 537.
102. Court Suit Filed on Alien Job Issue, Nuestro, Jan.-Feb. 1984, at 13.
103. See Amy Novick, An Update of Alien Restrictions for Public Benefits, 13
Immigration Newsletter, July-Aug. 1984, at 8.
104. See supra note 3.
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legally interferes with respondents' property interests, liberty in-
terests, and rights to full and fair deportation hearings.
III. Conclusion
In modern society, employment often provides a person's sole
means of support and subsistence. Access to the necessities of life,
through employment, lays the basis for the actualization of such
human values as friendship, love, skill, art, knowledge, and plea-
sure. Because employment is fundamental, it should not be taken
away absent a due process hearing. Under current immigration
laws, issues such as alienage, unauthorized employment, and de-
portability are not actually adjudicated until the deportation hear-
ing itself.
Furthermore, a solution to the so-called "illegal immigration
problem" does not lie in regulations such as the automatic no-work
rider which attempts to coerce respondents to leave the country
voluntarily and forgo the right to a deportation hearing. The
threat of expulsion is a feeble deterrent for people who lack jobs
in their own land105 or who fear persecution for political reasons if
they return to their country. Theirs is a life or death problem: sur-
vival. Many risk death in order to come here.106 Many prefer in-
definite detention to deportation.1 0 7
United States citizens should begin to analyze critically the
causes of migration to the United States. One of the causes is
United States foreign policy, which has the effect of draining the
Third World's resources. Those who wish to decrease migration to
the United States should look for ways in which our policies could
decrease poverty and encourage true development in the Ameri-
cas. Any such change, however, will require vigorous popular and
congressional resistance to the policies of a United States adminis-
tration which has ignored equity for the poor and the oppressed
peoples of the Americas, both those outside and those within the
borders of the United States.
105. Oscar Martinez, Chicanos and the Border Cities: An Interpretive Essay, 46
Pac. Hist. Rev. 85, 106 (1977).
106. Rev. Gbrard Jean-Juste, a Haitian activist in Miami, was quoted as saying,
"mT1he teeth of the shark are sweeter than the life we leave behind." Minneapolis
Star & Tribune, Frail boats again bringing exodus of Haiti's poor to U.S., April 3,
1985, at Al, col. 2. Rev. Jean-Juste was referring to Haitian refugees whose boats
sink before they reach the United States.
107. Id. at All.
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